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ABSTRACT
What is the impact of geopolitical competition on conﬂict resolution
and democratisation in the context of extensive and multi-directional
linkages and leverage? Our analysis demonstrates of the Moldova and
its Transnistrian conﬂict demonstrates that state weakness
simultaneously provides the scope for external leverage and limits its
effects. The EU (and US), on the one hand, and Russia, on the other,
have used their respective leverage relative to their level of
cooperation or rivalry in the wider global context. Long existing and
newly built linkages channel this geopolitical relationship which
remains the main factor in conﬂict management and democratisation
in Moldova.
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Introduction
Why has there been no substantial progress towards the resolution of any of the so-called
“frozen conﬂicts” almost a quarter of a century since the demise of the Soviet Union
despite considerable efforts by the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and the US? This is an important
question to answer because the persistence of these conﬂicts poses a continuing security
challenge in an area of increasingly intense geopolitical competition between Russia and
the West1 that has become ever more acute since the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine.
The Transnistrian conﬂict in Moldova is one of a number of these so-called “frozen con-
ﬂicts” in the post-Soviet Russian periphery, including also Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
Georgia, Nagornyi Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and more recently also Luhansk/Donetsk in
eastern Ukraine. While none of these conﬂicts are exactly the same and while they have
followed different trajectories since their emergence from the late-1980s onwards, there
are sufﬁcient similarities between them to treat them as manifestations of a particular
type of conﬂict involving unrecognised, de-facto states in the post-Communist region of
Europe (Caspersen 2009; Fawn 2008; Hill 2010; Lynch 2004; Lynch 2007) and beyond (Bah-
cheli, Bartmann, and Srebrnik 2004; Caspersen, Stansﬁeld, and Stansﬁeld 2010; Caspersen
2011).
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
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By applying the concepts of linkage and leverage (Levitsky and Way 2005; Levitsky and
Way 2006), we argue that it is the relative inﬂuence that Russia and the West have in
Moldova and Transnistria, and the way in which they exercise it, that is the fundamental
reason why, more than two decades after Moldovan independence and the establishment
of a de-facto state in Transnistria, there is no reasonable prospect of a settlement in the
near future, and that the prospects of achieving one have, in fact, diminished. In other
words, we hypothesise that an increase in great-power competition causes diminished
prospects for conﬂict settlement.
The Transnistrian conﬂict is a useful case study to test this principal hypothesis and
develop further explanatory hypotheses that illustrate more clearly the causal mechanisms
at work. The period between 2003 and 2015, on which we predominantly focus, provides
sufﬁcient variation on our independent variable (competitive inﬂuence by great powers)
for an in-case comparison: two periods of heightened competition (2003 and 2012–
2014) frame a period of tentative rapprochement (2010–2012). We use a combination
of process tracing and what van Evera (2015) calls “congruence procedure type 2” to
examine the dynamics of the conﬂict settlement process, speciﬁcally the relationship
between our independent variable (competitive inﬂuence-seeking by Russia and the
EU) and our dependent variable the prospects of a settlement of the Transnistrian conﬂict.
We rely on a range of different data sources – participant observation, interviews, ofﬁcial
statements, and media. Both authors have had a long-standing involvement with Moldova.2
Through this involvement, both authors have ﬁrst-hand experience with key local and inter-
national actors in Chisinau, Tiraspol, and Brussels, conducted interviews with them and par-
ticipated in numerous events on the conﬂict settlement process in these locations.3 This
provides the rich empirical knowledge on which we base our analysis.
We proceed as follows. After framing our argument theoretically in the regime change
literature, we offer a brief chronological narrative on Moldova and Transnistria between
Russia and the EU. We then examine comparatively the linkage and leverage that the
West and Russia exercise in Moldova and Transnistria, respectively, and assess what
impact they have on the dynamics of the Transnistrian conﬂict. This enables us to draw
conclusions at two levels. First, at an empirical level, we conclude that the balance of
linkage/leverage between the West and Russia has changed over the past decade in
favour of the West, but differently in relation to Moldova and Transnistria. Having failed
to secure a favourable settlement to the conﬂict in 2003, Russia still retains sufﬁcient
linkage and leverage on both banks of the River Nistru to block any progress towards
an unfavourable settlement of the Transnistrian conﬂict. Second, we ﬁnd that there is sig-
niﬁcant analytical purchase in extending the linkage/leverage explanation to investigate
the impact of competitive great-power inﬂuence on the dynamics of a local conﬂict.
Linkage, leverage, and geopolitical competition in weak states
Systematically developed by Levitsky and Way (2005), Levitsky and Way (2006), the
notions of linkage and leverage have formed the backbone of many explanations of the
success and failure of democracy promotion,4 and have more recently also been
applied to cases of autocracy promotion. They thus offer a useful starting point for any dis-
cussion of competing external inﬂuences on states undergoing transition processes.5
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Levitsky and Way (2005) deﬁne Western leverage as “authoritarian governments’ vul-
nerability to external democratizing pressure.” They argue that leverage can be exerted
in various ways including political conditionality, punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure,
and military intervention. The degree of leverage is determined by at least three factors:
the raw size and military strength of the targeted state; whether there are any competing
issues on the Western foreign policy agendas relating to this state/region; and whether
there is another alternative (regional) power that provides political, economic, or military
support (Levitsky and Way 2005, 21f., 27).
Such leverage is most effective when combined with linkage. This is deﬁned as primar-
ily a structural variable, mostly a product of geography, of historical factors such as colo-
nialism and geostrategic alliances, and of long-term processes of social and economic
integration. Linkage manifests itself in the extent of a regime’s ties to the US, EU, and
Western-dominated multilateral institutions. There are at least ﬁve dimensions of
linkage: economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society
linkage (Levitsky and Way 2005).
While the original concepts of linkage and leverage were developed with a speciﬁc view
to democracy-promoting foreign policy efforts of Western actors, they can be, and have
been, applied to autocracy promotion as well. Burnell and Schlumberger (2010) were
among the ﬁrst to point out that the importance of international factors in national politi-
cal regime development was well established in democratisation studies and that similarly
relevant international factors were among the potentially crucial factors to explain the resi-
lience and spread of non-democratic rule as well.6
Competitive inﬂuence-seeking, as we deﬁne it here, thus refers to the building of lin-
kages and use of leverage by rival external actors. The interests that underpin the activities
of Russia and the West (speciﬁcally the EU), in the case of the Transnistrian conﬂict are their
respective attempts to secure stable and friendly countries in their neighbourhood. Com-
petition arises primarily from incompatible notions of “friendliness” in what is in fact a
shared neighbourhood that requires countries located there to make a choice in terms
of their geopolitical orientation eastward or westward. The level of competition
between Russia and the West, our independent variable, is reﬂected in the incentives
and disincentives that they use to inﬂuence government policy and public opinion in
relation to this geopolitical orientation.
Our dependent variable cannot be easily or usefully “coded” in a binary way either.
Rather, we conceive of prospects for the settlement of the Transnistrian conﬂict in
terms of the intensity and results of negotiations between Moldova and Transnistria in
the framework of the OSCE-led 5 + process (both in formal rounds of negotiations and
in the context of 1 + meetings between the chief negotiators, as well as in other
formats, such as the so-called Working Groups). This allows us to describe a sufﬁcient
degree of variance in our dependent variable even though the conﬂict has remained
unresolved.
We do not seek to explain the reasons for rivalry or ﬂuctuation in the intensity of rivalry,
but rather the impact that the resulting competitive inﬂuence-seeking has on the pro-
spects of conﬂict settlement. In other words, we examine ﬁrst of all co-variation
between our independent and dependent variables: if our hypothesis holds, an increase
in rivalry between Russia and the West goes hand in hand with diminishing prospects
for conﬂict settlement. Second, we use process tracing to explain how variation in our
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independent variable, that is, competitive inﬂuence-seeking, causes variation in our
dependent variable, that is, prospects for conﬂict settlement.
Background: Moldova and Transnistria between Russia and the EU
The Transnistrian conﬂict dates back to the beginning of post-Soviet Moldova’s transition
process in the early 1990s and has been inextricably linked with it ever since (Gordon 2012;
Sasse 2009; Wolff 2012, 2011). Yet, the relationship between the conﬂict, the transition
process, and competing promoters of autocracy and democracy, respectively, is a compli-
cated one. Writing in 2005, Levitsky and Way (2005) characterised Moldova as a country
where the West had a high level of leverage and a low level of linkage, resulting in unstable
authoritarian government where elections replace one authoritarian leader with another
one – a thesis that is conﬁrmed by the succession of Moldovan presidents in the 1990s
and early 2000s: Mircea Snegur (1990–1997), Petru Lucinschi (1997–2001) and Vladimir
Voronin (2001–2009). This pattern changed in 2009 when disputed elections that had
returned the Communist Party under Voronin to power in April sparked off street demon-
strations. Police violence against demonstrators brought a strong reaction from NGOs and
Western capitals, and when the Communists failed to secure enough votes in parliament
to elect a president, fresh parliamentary elections were held in July 2009. These brought to
power a new coalition – the Alliance for European Integration – which defended its par-
liamentary majority in subsequent elections in 2010 and 2014.
These political changes in Moldova can be well explained with Levitsky and Way’s
theory: EU linkage and leverage increased signiﬁcantly compared to the 1990s, enabled
not least through the more comprehensive, more strategic, and better funded engage-
ment of the EU with Moldova following the launch of the Union’s European Neighbour-
hood Policy in 2003. The EU and Moldova had already signed a Partnership and
Association Agreement in 1998, but a step-change in relations only occurred with the
launch of the ENP and the Moldovan Communist Party’s greater openness towards
closer ties with the Union from 2003 onwards, which resulted in the development and
adoption of an ENP Action Plan in 2004/5. Moldova continued its pro-European course fol-
lowing the political changes in 2009, but on a much accelerated pace that saw the country
join the European Energy Community in 2010 and conclude an Association Agreement
with the EU in June 2014, which also includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreement (DCFTA).
Yet, Moldova’s expected transition to a more consolidated democracy after 2009 did
not follow a simple linear path. EU leverage and linkages were balanced by Russia exercis-
ing its own leverage (e.g. import restrictions, gas embargoes, Transnistria) and intensifying
linkages (Russian TV, historical and cultural ties). Economically and socially, Moldova
remains the poorest country in Europe; the average salary is $277 a month, the per
capita GDP was $2233 in 2006.7 The country’s economy has remained weak and vulner-
able: Moldova has few natural resources and depends on Russian energy; with a few
exceptions, industrial and agricultural output has declined compared to the Soviet era,
a trend which has encouraged a nostalgia for this period and expresses itself as a latent
linkage to Russia. Entrenched economic inertia has resulted in many of the more active
Moldovans going abroad: of a working population of 1.2 million, over one-third are
recorded as working outside Moldova.8 As a result, the country has become heavily
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dependent on remittances from labour migrants. Remittances of around $2bn annually,
dwarf ofﬁcial development aid of just under $375m (principally from the EU, the US and
multinational donor agencies, such as the World Bank and UNDP) and foreign direct
investment of $350m.9
Political changes in Chisinau after 2009 were initially not “matched” in Tiraspol, the de-
facto capital of Transnistria. Here, the situation remained by and large unchanged for two
decades with Igor Smirnov ﬁrmly in charge of the break-away territory. However, in 2011
he was forced to concede defeat in the ﬁrst round of presidential elections. The winner of
the second round, and current Transnistrian leader, was Yevgeny Shevchuk, a former
Speaker of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet who defeated the Moscow-backed candidate
Anatoliy Kaminski.10 Russian military presence, Transnistria’s economic dependence, and
the social and cultural orientation of the majority of its population towards Moscow
have combined over the years to solidify Russia’s hold on the region. In contrast to
right-bank Moldova, Transnistria was never part of the Romanian cultural space and its
residents are generally fearful of Romanianisation and thus rely on Russia also as a protec-
tor of their cultural identity which its leaders have promoted as distinctly Transnistrian, and
thus different from the rest of Moldova, for over 20 years.
Against this background, the Transnistrian conﬂict settlement process has made no tan-
gible progress towards a solution. While there were several periods of intense negotiations
when the parties came close to a settlement (especially in the context of the 2003 Kozak
Memorandum) and which resulted in a number of “successes” in the form of a range of
issue speciﬁc agreements (after the 1997 Primakov Memorandum, in the context of the
2005 Yushchenko Plan, as part of the 2010 Meseberg process and in the early days of
the Shevchuk administration in Transnistria in the ﬁrst half of 2012), a settlement
remains elusive.
Precarious progress: EU leverage and linkage in Moldova and Transnistria
For the EU in the 1990s, Moldova was but a small blip on the radar. Attention was else-
where: where the Balkans raged, Moldova simmered. EU diplomatic coverage was from
member-state embassies in Moscow. European Commission programmes, once they
started, were run from Kyiv. This limited presence was also reﬂected in EU spending on
programmes in Moldova. The EU disbursed €320 million in the period 1991–2006, but
the leverage effect of this aid was limited. Approximation to EU norms, in both economic
and political domains, did not increase the depth of EU leverage. Without serious presence
on the ground and with relatively limited spending, it was difﬁcult to apply any condition-
ality or to monitor compliance with conditions effectively. It was easy for successive Mol-
dovan governments to proclaim their democratic values and European aspirations without
having to follow through on necessary reforms to demonstrate either in practice.
The adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 and the launch of the European
Neighbourhood Policy foresaw a need for a ring of well-governed states around the EU
(Whitman and Wolff 2010). Following the accession of Baltic and central European
states to the EU in 2004, and of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, Moldova not only
became an immediate neighbour of a signiﬁcantly enlarged EU but the eastern direction
of these two rounds of enlargement also brought in new member states that promoted a
more active approach by the EU. This was most visible in the Eastern Partnership initiative
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launched in 2009. As a result, funding for Moldova increased dramatically (from around
€40m per year in 2007 to €131m by 2014), as did the presence of the EU and (partly
through increased membership) its member states in Chisinau. As problems developed
with other countries covered by the Eastern Partnership (and similarly in the southern
dimension of the ENP), Moldova came to be seen as a model student.11 Increased pres-
ence, funding, and more strategic engagement gradually were reﬂected in enhanced lin-
kages and the use of leverage by the EU over the ﬁrst nearly decade-and-a-half of the 21st
century. This, unsurprisingly, increased competition with Russia in the shared neighbour-
hood (Tolstrup 2013).
While EU engagement with Moldova developed across the board, the change was par-
ticularly noteworthy in that the EU became more interested in a settlement of the Trans-
nistrian conﬂict. In the period between 1992, when Transnistria was established as a de
facto separate entity on the left bank of the River Nistru, and 2002, the EU left the conﬂict
settlement process essentially to the OSCE. But from 2002, when the EU ﬁrst sent represen-
tatives to joint Transnistrian-Moldova constitutional discussions, there was a more active
approach, aided by the expectation that, with the accession to the EU of Romania, the
problem would be on the borders of the EU and pose a challenge to the EU’s vision of
a stable neighbourhood.
A prime example, and perhaps the high-point of the use of leverage during the ﬁrst
decade of the 2000s, of western leverage was the last-minute decision by President
Voronin in November 2003 not to sign an agreement on the Transnistrian issue devised
by Russian presidential representative Dmitry Kozak. The EU and US view was that the
agreement would allow Transnistria (and thus Russia) to paralyse any new government,
exert a veto on key foreign policy decisions, and allow Russian forces in Transnistria to
stay on. Voronin was heavily pressured, over the phone, by then EU High Representative
Javier Solana and on the ground by the US Ambassador to Moldova (Hill 2012, 149–153).
Western leverage at the time, however, was also enhanced by domestic factors. The
publication of the settlement proposal triggered anti-government demonstrations in Chi-
sinau at a time when the Rose Revolution in Georgia was in full swing. Moreover, the pro-
posed settlement would have established an almost indeﬁnite Russian military presence in
Moldova that would have signiﬁcantly increased Russian leverage (Hill 2012, 156) on the
basis of consolidated and expanded linkages. Given this prospect, and perceiving a real
domestic threat to his own political survival, Voronin bowed to Western pressure.
Voronin’s subsequent turn towards the EU marks the beginning of a process that saw a
number of developments that combined to deepen the relationship between Moldova
and the EU. Having snubbed President Putin over the Kozak memorandum, Voronin
had effectively committed Moldova to a more pro-European policy. Although he favoured
the process (and funds) of the ENP over a thorough adoption of EU values, the EU’s lever-
age gradually increased in absolute terms as well as relative to Russia. And so did linkages
across different sectors, especially at political and economic levels.
The EU granted Autonomous Trade Preferences to Moldova in 2008, enabling most
Moldovan goods (including those from Transnistrian companies registered in Chisinau)
to enter the EU duty-free and mostly quota-free. Subsequent negotiations with the EU
for a DCFTA from 2012 brought about a counter-offer from Russia, which suggested
Moldova would be better off joining the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan customs union, and
warnings from Russian ofﬁcials of problems to come.12 While there was a positive response
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from the Communist Party and others in Chisinau, the post-2009 AEI government contin-
ued towards initialling of a DCFTA at Vilnius in November 2013 and signature in June
2014,13 underlining its clear political orientation towards the EU.14 Yet, the EU was itself
changing and momentum for further enlargement had visibly diminished by 2014. With
the possibility of EU membership for Moldova being seen by some in Chisinau as a
myth,15 EU leverage in the form of the lure of assured membership also decreased.
The pattern of linkages in Moldova is complex. There is foreign investment in Moldova
from the EU, but Russian companies hold key assets; trade with the EU has expanded, but
the Russian market remains important. Moldovan exports to the EU have grown from only
20% of all its exports in 2000 to 46% by 2014, while exports to Russia had fallen to 26% by
2014, largely due to Russian import restrictions.16
Public attitudes reﬂect this complexity. According to a 2009 survey, 62% of right-bank
Moldovans saw the EU in a positive light (a November 2011 survey reduces this to 47%),
but 59% of Moldovans also see Russia positively. A survey in January 2014 showed a fall in
support for the EU (at 44%), with a similar percentage favouring joining the Customs Union
(40%). The drop in enthusiasm for the EU is attributed by commentators in Chisinau as
being due to poor communication towards the public on the part of the EU.17
Similarly, “political” linkage in right-bank Moldova is, while strong, limited to the pro-
European political elite in the capital and does not (or no longer) extend to either the Com-
munist Party or to lower layers of the administration outside Chisinau. That said, contact
with the EU has become extensive in both depth and breadth. Moldovan ministers are fre-
quently in Brussels and other EU capitals, interaction by ofﬁcials is now frequent across the
board as Moldovans struggle with the all-pervasive acquis communautaire in the context of
the implementation of the Association Agreement and the DCFTA. Most Moldovan minis-
tries host an EU expert.
In terms of social linkages, the inﬂuence of Moldova’s large diaspora has increased
awareness of the better life abroad. Many want to achieve a “European lifestyle” by
working in the EU. In addition, visa free travel to the EU’s Schengen zone, available
since April 2014, has been a key prize for Moldovan political elites and is a key factor in
further increasing social linkages. While an Association Agreement is valuable in national
terms, there is little tangible for ordinary Moldovan citizens,18 and the DCFTA entails both
opportunities and risks for Moldovan businesses. Visa free access, in contrast, is recognised
as an attractive, immediate, and useful good: 200,000 Moldovans visited the EU under the
new regime in the ﬁrst four months of operation. Such linkage has also strengthened exist-
ing and created new constituencies to exert leverage. While the usual effect of social lin-
kages is informal, and mediated through family and friends, Moldovan diaspora
organisations have become overt political actors. Diaspora groups in Spain, Italy, and
the US have called (as early as April 2012) upon the AEI coalition government to press
ahead with legislation outlawing sexual (and other forms of) discrimination, as required
by the EU and the Council of Europe.19 This was speciﬁcally to counter the Communist
Party and the Orthodox Church, which oppose LGBT rights. The Orthodox Church in
Moldova, part of the Russian patriarchate, represents another long-embedded Russian
linkage.20
The European Commission, member states, and multilateral bodies have provided
extensive funding and training for government and NGOs on the practice of democracy
during the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s and into the second decade, when, as a result of
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increased ground presence, the EU and member states made available ample funding and
travel opportunities for NGOs. Given the small number of people involved in politics, jour-
nalism and advocacy, and the relatively high level of education (for example English
language skills), urban civil society gained greatly in strength through the decade. By
2009, many civil society leaders had joined EU-based and other international networks,
enabling an effective response to the alleged electoral fraud in the April 2009 parliamen-
tary elections. However, such linkage remained limited to relatively few “elite”, Chisinau-
based civil society actors, and linkage “effects” of increased EU funding for civil society
were more limited outside the capital.
In contrast to even the limited success stories detailed above, linkage in relation to
media remains weak. During the Voronin era, media critical of his government were
likely to be harassed. This often took the form of defamation lawsuits, but also included
attempts to remove the licence of the only non-state TV channel which did not support
the government, and it took direct pressure from the EU for Pro TV to retain its licence.
Under the AEI, in April 2012 the broadcasting council refused to renew the licence of
broadcaster NIT, citing its bias towards the Communist Party. A restructuring of cable
TV channels in 2014, removing three channels from several cable TV packages, brought
warnings from the OSCE and others on the dangers of limiting press freedom.21
The inﬂuence of western media is countered by a very strong Russian media presence:
most Moldovans prefer the excitement of Russian TV channels to the rather staid and paro-
chial Moldovan TV. The Russian print media dominates.22 A meeting of parliament on the
threats to Moldova on 19 March 2014 identiﬁed Russian TV channels as the main source of
news for Moldovans.23 The Audiovisual Council undertook to monitor their output and
suspended Rossiya 24 for six months and sanctioned other channels.24 There appears
little will and capacity to build an attractive Moldovan and Russian-language counter-
offer to the predominance of pro-Russian print and electronic media. Moldovan auth-
orities’ resort to tactics that limit the freedom of media suggests a degree of EU linkage
“failure”, namely the failure to entrench democratic norms and values, such as respect
for media freedom.
The ability of the EU to exert inﬂuence over Transnistria is considerably more limited.
Having been largely absent as an actor in its own right from the conﬂict settlement
process until the early 2000s, the EU (and US) joined the OSCE-led negotiating format
as an ofﬁcial observer in 2005. Given its heretofore limited presence on the ground, and
drawing lessons from the 2003 experience with the Kozak Memorandum, the EU
appointed a Special Representative for Moldova to be principally concerned with the
Transnistrian issue (Adriaan Jacobovits 2005–2007, Kalman Mizsei 2007–2011). This
enabled the EU to build up contact with Transnistrian leaders, and a means of starting
its own process of conﬁdence building, with Commission ﬁnancial support.
When post-Kozak talks showed no sign of progressing, the EU strategy was to “change
facts on the ground”, building linkages (in the form of creating western-style institutions in
Ukraine and Moldova) and leverage (in gaining control for Moldova of the unregulated
border between Transnistria and Ukraine). The Orange Revolution in Ukraine facilitated
the establishment of the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in 2005. Starting with
70 EU staff, the operation has now grown to over 100 EU staff, some 120 local staff in
Ukraine and Moldova, and a biannual budget of €21 million. Achieving control over the
Transnistrian segment of the Ukraine–Moldova border has enabled Chisinau to implement
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an agreement under which Kyiv only recognises Chisinau’s customs documents. As a
result, Transnistrian companies have to be registered in Chisinau for exports to Ukraine
and the CIS. This translated into highly effective leverage, further enhanced through the
incentives offered by the granting of ATP status to Moldova in 2008. It also increased econ-
omic linkage between Transnistria and the EU, with 29% of Transnistrian exports going to
EU markets in 2012. This was higher than exports to Russia at 22.2%. Including exports to
Moldova of around 35% of all Transnistrian exports, effectively creates an enormous econ-
omic dependency for Transnistria in the context of the DCFTA. As ATP rights for Transnis-
trian companies were extended until December 2015, a window of opportunity was
created to exert further leverage and enhance linkages in order to tie Transnistrian econ-
omic actors (and their political masters and allies) closer into the EU orbit as the removal of
trading privileges with the EU after 2015 would be a severe blow to Transnistrian expor-
ters, who in turn provide signiﬁcant tax revenue to the Transnistrian administration. Yet,
the lack of ﬂexibility so far on the part of the EU to ﬁnd compromise solutions and the
counter-leverage that Russia exercises, the closing of this window without a solution
will be a severe blow to EU inﬂuence over Transnistria instead.
Little has been achieved by the EU in relation to linkage and leverage in the political
sphere. In February 2008, the EU lifted its ﬁve-year long visa ban on selected members
of the Transnistrian administration considered to be less hard-line, which made it possible
to invite the then Speaker of the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet, Yevgeny Shevchuk, to visit
European capitals. Since Shevchuk’s ascendance to the Transnistrian presidency, such
visits by him and other senior ofﬁcials have increased, but this has not resulted in a signiﬁ-
cant increase of either linkage or leverage, because the scope for conditionality and the
incentives that the EU can offer are limited in absolute terms and relative to what
Russia has invested. The EU’s and member states’ projects in Transnistria may bring
beneﬁts to the population, but the linkage effect is small and most of the Transnistrian
population remains ﬁrmly oriented towards Russia and suspicious of the EU. This is due
to the fact that most Transnistrian residents (as most residents on the right bank) watch
Russian TV, and there has been little movement by the Moldovan government to
project EU or Moldovan TV or radio into Transnistria. Transnistrian holders of Moldovan
passports are able to access visa free travel to the Schengen area.25 Yet, historically
links to Russia remain strong and there is ample scope to travel to Russia, facilitated by
a Russian consulate in Tiraspol, a presence which also encourages Transnistrians to take
up Russian citizenship26.
Where EU linkage has seen some progress is with the creation of programmes to bring
together ordinary citizens on each bank to build up contacts. Member states’ embassies
have also created linkages between the EU and Transnistrian civil society, for example
bringing together young people from both sides of the River Nistru in the “Transnistrian
Dialogues” and facilitating organised visits to Brussels. The EU itself began to build up pro-
jects in Transnistria with the Support to Civil Society programme from 2009. EU funding
was extended to projects in Transnistria, as a proportion of EU aid for Moldova: potentially
this was up to 15% of the Euro 273 million earmarked for Moldova from the European
Neighbourhood programme 2011–2013.
Yet, such outreach activities aimed at increasing cooperation between Transnistrian
and Moldovan NGOs and enhancing people-to-people contacts have become more
restricted since late 2012, primarily as a result of an unwillingness to engage on the
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part of the Transnistrian authorities, who, in turn, are under signiﬁcant Russian pressure to
limit access to, and for, civil society activists. EU-funded projects have also been insufﬁcient
in quantity and quality to counteract the weighty Russian linkage (supported by substan-
tial leverage) found there.
EU linkage and leverage have, over the past decade-and-a-half, increased to some
extent on both banks of the River Nistru, but they have had only a limited and not necess-
arily positive effect on the trajectory of the conﬂict settlement process. While the right
bank has clearly moved closer to the EU, and would be susceptible to EU leverage for a
settlement of the conﬂict, there has been no similarly strong increase of EU leverage
and linkage on the left bank. In fact, the growth of EU linkages on the right bank,
driven by the democracy promotion agenda embedded in the ENP, has strengthened
the divisions between the two banks, and on the right bank itself.
Sufﬁcient blockage: Russian linkage and leverage in Moldova and
Transnistria
Russian linkage and leverage in Moldova and Transnistria is almost a mirror image of the
EU’s: larger (and increasing) on the left bank, and comparatively smaller on the right bank.
As with the EU, however, the exercise of Russian inﬂuence is played out as part of a greater
geopolitical game in the shared neighbourhood, with the Transnistrian conﬂict being sim-
ultaneously affected by geopolitical considerations and being of signiﬁcant instrumental
value in their pursuit.
Moscow’s leverage is based on economic foundations in a similar way that the EU’s is,
owing to the many weaknesses and dependencies of the Moldovan and Transnistrian
economies. For example, Russia was opposed to Moldova joining the European Energy
Community, primarily because of the requirement for “unbundling” which means that
Russian energy giant Gazprom would have to lose its substantial stake in Moldovagaz,
when what Gazprom really wants is to increase its stake in, or even own Moldovagaz out-
right. Russia combined pressure with incentives, even linking the European Energy Com-
munity with its own geopolitical project in the neighbourhood, the Customs Union. The
then Russian Ambassador to Moldova Valerii Kuzmin, for example argued that joining
the customs union could mean Moldovans receiving cheaper gas. Despite becoming a
member of the Energy Community, Moldova suspended implementation of the underpin-
ning agreement until 2020. As a “reward”, a visit by Moldovan Economy Minister Lazar to
Moscow in September 2013 resulted in an agreement with Gazprom to extend the 2011
gas supply contract, with prices remaining at 2011 levels. At the same time, these incen-
tives also increase Russian leverage. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin
warned in September 2013 that Moldova’s drawing closer to the EU might affect gas
prices, demonstrating how Russia seeks to use its economic leverage for political gain.
There are two further economic aspects of Russian linkages which can facilitate lever-
age: Russian investments in Moldova and Moldovan labour migrants in Russia. Russia has
been the largest single foreign investor in Moldova, with its share in FDI slightly increasing
from 23% in 2009 to 24% in 2013, and the absolute total reaching $787m in 2013 (up from
$595m in 2009),27 with further signiﬁcant Russian investment in, and control of, the
banking sector.28 There are also pro-Russian businessmen who use part of their wealth
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to further pro-Russian political agendas,29 such as promotion of membership in the
Kremlin’s Eurasian Union.30
As noted earlier, Moldova is highly dependent on remittances to balance its trade
deﬁcit. While remittances from Russia have decreased over the years, and are now
worth only around half of remittances from EU countries, the Russian announcement in
September 2013 that it might repatriate some 190,000 Moldovan migrant workers, alleg-
edly working in Russia in violation of immigration rules, could be potentially devastating
for Moldova’s economy and social fabric. In April 2014, the Russian embassy in Chisinau
increased the stakes even further stating that up to 250,000 of the 573,000 Moldovans
in Russia might be expelled.31 While these expulsions have not taken place so far, their
very mention stokes fear in Moldova and underlines the vulnerability to Moscow’s threats.
A ﬁnal aspect of Russian leverage with an economic basis are Russian import restrictions
on Moldovan exports. As a form of leverage on Moldova, however, their effectiveness has
decreased. The Russian share of Moldovan wine exports, for example, fell from 50% in
2005 to 10% in 2007. When Russia announced it would restrict wine (and spirits)
imports in September 2013, Chisinau was less concerned than previously. Moreover, the
move backﬁred as the EU responded immediately by increasing quotas for Moldovan
wines from 1 January 2014.32
It is important to note that much of this played out in the period after 2012, and in par-
ticular in the period between the run-up to the Vilnius summit in late 2013, when Moldova
initialled its Association Agreement and DCFTA, and their actual signing half a year later in
June 2014. Throughout this period, right-bank Moldova experienced signiﬁcant Russian
pressure – through actual economic sanctions (import embargoes, gas price pressure
and reducing vital remittances) and more (or in some cases less) subtle threats, warning
of certain inevitable consequences of Moldova’s choice of turning towards the EU and
away from Russia.33
The direct effectiveness of Russian leverage on the government in Chisinau, however, is
questionable. Embattled though it is, the AEI government has so far stuck with its pro-EU
course, while many of its problems, such as the protracted coalition negotiations in the
aftermath of the November 2014 elections, the split of the Liberal-Democratic Party, the
short-lived premiership of Chiril Gaburici (February–June 2015), the prolonged coalition
negotiations before the appointment of Valeriu Strelet as prime minister at the end of
July 2015, and the lost no-conﬁdence vote at the end of October 2015 are in large part
due to rivalries in the pro-European camp. At the same time, Moldova has also been
engulfed in a major crisis in its banking sector that has exposed the endemic corruption
across state institutions and supposedly rival political parties. While the scandal over the
“vanishing” of approximately $1bn (one-eighth of Moldova’s annual GDP) also reﬂects the
pervasive presence and inﬂuence of Russian interests in the country, it has further under-
mined public conﬁdence in, and support for, the AEI coalition government.34
That said, the exertion of Russian leverage, or the threat thereof, has contributed to con-
solidating and enhancing the already signiﬁcant linkages that have their basis in a shared
history, a widely spoken common language, and the continuing existence of political,
social, and economic links between Russia and Moldova as evidenced above. Russia has
thus managed to further entrench the deep social, political, cultural, and regional clea-
vages in Moldova. This may not have increased its leverage over the current Moldovan
government, but it has been sufﬁcient to prevent any further meaningful European
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integration. In fact, the systemic political crisis that Moldova has experienced since 2009
and the critical weakness of its core state institutions (especially the judicial system, the
central bank, and civil service) that underpins it, have indirectly decreased EU political
(and economic) leverage. This becamemost evident in July 2015 when the inability of Mol-
dovan institutions to deliver on key reform commitments in the context of the ongoing
crisis in the banking sector led to the suspension of EU budget support – illustrating at
once the frustration of the EU with Moldova and its inability to turn leverage into tangible
reform progress.
In addition to the linkages and leverage that Russia has exercised in right-bankMoldova,
it has also used the Transnistrian conﬂict to consolidate its overall position vis-à-visMoldova.
Russia has so far reined in Transnistrian moves to become an independent state and con-
tinued to emphasise the need for a settlement that respects the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Moldova within its 1991 borders, preferring, for the moment, to keep the region
as an unstable irritant to the West.35 However, statements by Transnistrian politicians con-
cerning the entity’s independence or integration into Russia, unlikely to happen without
prior Russian approval, if not outright encouragement, put additional pressure on Chisi-
nau.36 The assumption is that this will increase Moldovan acceptance of reintegration of
Transnistria on Russian terms such that Moscow’s inﬂuence would extend over the whole
of Moldova, akin to the precedent set by the Kozak Memorandum in 2003.
Simultaneously, the Kremlin has prevented any substantial progress in the OSCE-spon-
sored 5 + process after some modest successes in the ﬁrst half of 2012.37 Similarly, there
has also been pressure on Latin-script Romanian language schools in Transnistria
coinciding with Moldovan advances towards the DCFTA38, and calls by Transnistria to
remove Moldovan ofﬁcials based in the security zone of Bender/Tighina, which is under
the control of Tiraspol.39
Leverage is also exercised through rumours of Russian intervention stretching from
eastern Ukraine westwards towards Odessa and Transnistria.40 Statements from NATO
that Russia had such a capability caused some alarm in Chisinau.41 There were also
Russian pundits who said a Russian absorption of Transnistria could parallel Russian
action in Crimea.42
In a similar way to using Transnistria as leverage against the Moldovan government,
additional pressure on right-bank Moldova has come from Gagauzia, an autonomous
region in the south of Moldova. Traditionally a region with strong connections to
Russia, Gagauzia sought to increase those connections after 2012 as Chisinau moved
closer to the EU in the context of progressing negotiations on the Association Agreement
and DCFTA.43 In February 2015, the authorities in Komrat held a referendum in which, at a
turnout of 70%, 98.4% of voters supported closer relations with the emerging Eurasian
Customs Union, while 97.2% simultaneously opposed closer EU integration. At the same
time, 98.9% of voters in the same referendum endorsed Gagauzia’s right to hold a refer-
endum on its independence should Moldova’s sovereign status change. While not legally
binding, and in fact declared illegal by a district court in Gagauzia’s capital Komrat, the
vote illustrates the attraction of Russia’s “offer” (manifest, for example, in selectively
lifting embargoes on agricultural imports from the Gagauzia region only) and the
limited appeal that the EU and the pro-European policy of the Moldovan government
have in Gagauzia.44 Balti, in the north of Moldova, and other localities also experienced
civil unrest said to be supported by Russia, under a “smouldering peat” operation.45
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This leverage of Russia over Moldova through the instrumentalisation of the Transnis-
trian conﬂict has been facilitated by the leverage Russia has over Transnistria, again pri-
marily based on the economic dependencies of the Transnistrian economy which
would collapse without Russian aid. Transnistria has a signiﬁcant budget deﬁcit (some
$200 million annually), and is dependent on Russia to plug the gap either through
budget support to the administration or through subsidies paid out to the population,
for example in direct payments to pensioners, which further reinforces already strong lin-
kages. Transnistria also receives cheap gas from Russia without which most Transnistrian
manufacturing would not remain proﬁtable. Since what little income the Transnistrian
administration receives through taxation comes from just a handful of these plants,
without these Russian subsidies the administration would collapse.
However, Russia does not simply pressure Transnistria, but there are genuine social, cul-
tural, economic, and political linkages that complement and sustain Russian leverage.
Thus, social and cultural orientation towards Russia combines with fear of Romanianisa-
tion. Russian economic support and ﬁnancial investment, as well as persistent strong
trade links, contrast with wide-spread fear that closer Moldovan ties with the EU will
have a signiﬁcant detrimental impact on the Transnistrian economy and residents’
living standards, as well as their cultural identity. While political linkage between Russia
and Transnistria at times may have been tenuous and strained under the presidency of
Vladimir Voronin, it has consolidated under his successor Shevchuk and it still is signiﬁ-
cantly stronger than any linkages with the EU.
Russia’s linkage and leverage over both Moldova and Transnistria, and the way it uses
them to exert inﬂuence, thus, remain an effective tool of Russian policy: the blockage the
Kremlin can create in particular through the instrumentalisation of the Transnistrian con-
ﬂict is sufﬁcient to exercise a veto on full Moldovan integration with the EU (and perhaps
even more importantly for Russia, NATO). Put differently, Russia either needs to achieve a
settlement of the Transnistrian conﬂict such that it can maintain a sufﬁcient foothold in
Moldovan politics to shape the country’s geopolitical orientation, or block any further
westward move of Moldova by keeping the Transnistrian conﬂict unresolved. In the
context of the intensifying geopolitical competition between Russia and the West in the
shared neighbourhood (and beyond), the former is hardly a realistic option as long as
the EU can use its leverage and linkage on the right bank to frustrate Russian efforts in
this respect. This leaves the latter as the default policy choice for Moscow.
Conclusion
The extent of inﬂuence exercised by the lead players in the Transnistrian conﬂict, the EU
(and US), on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, has been a function of the level of
their cooperation or rivalry in the wider global context and how this has played out in
their efforts to exert leverage on Moldova. This has been evident in the effectiveness or
otherwise of efforts to resolve the Transnistrian issue.
This pattern of so far ultimately unsuccessful conﬂict settlement efforts can be
explained by linking the existence and use of linkage and leverage by great powers to
the degree of rivalry between them. During the period between the 1997 Primakov Mem-
orandum and the failed Kozak plan, relations between Russia and the West were initially
relatively “harmonious” in the late Yeltsin period. Combined with the fairly limited interest
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that the US and EU displayed in Moldova at that time, and the more positive relations
between Chisinau, Tiraspol and Moscow at the time, a large number of agreements on
speciﬁc issues of the relationship between Moldova and Transnistria were negotiated
(although their status and degree of implementation remains matter of debate to this
day). As relations between Russia and the West became tenser in the wake of Putin’s
rise to power, Moldova became a more important part of geostrategic considerations
by both sides, not least in the context of the eastward expansion of NATO in 1999 and
in 2004 and of the EU in 2004 that brought both organisations to the borders of Russia.
The limited leverage the West had over the government in Chisinau was sufﬁcient to
stymy Russian efforts to gain a permanent foothold in all of Moldova through the Kozak
plan.
Molodova’s European turn after 2003 in combination with the further eastward expan-
sion of the EU in 2007, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the 2005 Yushchenko Plan
increased Western linkages and leverage, but simultaneously heightened the intensity of
competition with Russia. The ill-fated attempt by Chisinau to implement the Yushchenko
Plan (by unilaterally passing a law on the status of Transnistria) was vehemently rejected
by Tiraspol and Moscow, and formal negotiations in the OSCE-led format broke down in
2006.
An initially promising but in the end failing rapprochement between Russia and the EU
in the context of the Meseberg process from 2010 onwards, saw Russia and the West agree
on the need to reopen formal negotiations in the 5 + format and use their linkage and
leverage to bring Chisinau and Tiraspol together at the negotiations table. Initial progress
in the talks in 2011–2012 was further helped by regime change on both sides of the River
Nistru in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Yet, the optimism about a settlement quickly dissi-
pated as geopolitical rivalry once more increased after the reinstatement of Putin into the
Russian presidency, the failure of the US “reset”, and the intensiﬁcation of negotiations
between the EU and Moldova on an Association Agreement (alongside similar processes
elsewhere in the shared neighbourhood, in Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia). Consequently,
the OSCE-facilitated settlement process gradually slowed down after 2012 and has now
ground to a halt in the context of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, in itself an indication of
the new ferocity of geopolitical competition in the post-Soviet region.
Yet, geopolitical considerations to one side, the effectiveness of inﬂuence has also been
determined by the extent of linkage and leverage that both sides had built up over time.
Thus, while we can explain events in Moldova within the framework of Levitsky and Way’s
theory of democratisation, we have also demonstrated how this theory can be modiﬁed to
apply the concepts of linkage and leverage to competitive inﬂuence-seeking by rival
powers in systemically weak and divided states.
Using this conceptualisation of events in Moldova over the past ten years, we argued
that both Russia and the EU have been able to use leverage and linkage in pursuit of
their interests. The EU, starting from a much lower base than Russia for a variety of primar-
ily historical reasons and legacy effects, has managed to increase both leverage and
linkage in relation to right-bank Moldova, but much less so in relation to the left bank.
The EU’s increased engagement with Moldova, however, has been primarily driven by
an economic agenda and manifested itself in the drawn-out process of negotiating an
Association Agreement, including a DCFTA. Put differently, the EU has failed to extend pol-
itical and other linkages beyond a core group of Moldovan politicians and civil society
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activists, partly because the Commission-driven DCFTA agenda failed to grasp the com-
plexities and nuances of Moldova’s political landscape. In the absence of broadly based
and different types of salient linkages, leverage is ultimately limited, especially if there
is a strong and at least partially attractive alternative available, as has been the case in
the shape of Russia.
In the context of the kind of great-power competition that has been played out in
Moldova, EU efforts to increase linkages have thus not resulted in sufﬁcient levels of leverage
to neutralise Russian inﬂuence. While this Russian inﬂuence may have declined relative to
that of the EU on the right bank, it has remained substantial there, as evident from the
results of the November 2014 parliamentary elections in Moldova. Equally importantly,
Russian linkage and leverage have not only had an impact on maintaining social, cultural,
and political cleavages in Moldova and between societies on both banks of the River
Nistru but they have also contributed to the persistence of weak state institutions incapable
of effective reform, which in turn diminishes the effectiveness of Western leverage.
On the left bank, EU linkage and leverage pale in comparison to Russia. In contrast to
the EU, and as a result of its far greater inﬂuence on Tiraspol, Moscow has been able to
instrumentalise the Transnistrian conﬂict in order to increase further its leverage over
Chisinau.
In a country that is as divided along salient cleavages of language, culture, and geopo-
litical orientation as Moldova, and suffers from a chronic and systemic weakness of its insti-
tutions, this particular kind of geopolitical competition cannot but signiﬁcantly and
negatively affect the prospects of conﬂict settlement. Not only has the gulf between
the left and the right bank of the River Nistru increased but the differences between
Moscow and Brussels over the conﬂict also appear more profound than ever in the
period after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the Transnistrian conﬂict has
become far less resolvable.
Notes
1. We treat Western linkage and leverage from the EU and the US as a single inﬂuence on
Moldova. For example, Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eur-
asian Affairs at the State Department, stated in January 2014 that the United States has ‘been
extremely supportive of the Eastern Partnership and the opportunity that the European Union
has given to countries to its East for association with the EU, for free trade association, and
visa-free travel opportunity. We think this is an enormous positive for countries like
Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.’ Imedia, Moldova 11 January 2014.
2. Beyer was British Ambassador to Moldova 2006–2009, during which time he built up several
pioneering projects to establish connections between the communities of Transnistria and
right-bank Moldova. In 2011, he undertook a ﬁeld study of popular attitudes to Transnistria’s
reintegration in Moldova under the EU-funded People’s Peacemaking Perspectives, sponsored
by NGO Saferworld (Beyer 2011). This included the ﬁrst focus group studies in Transnistria by a
Western researcher. Wolff has been a consultant to successive Moldova governments, the
OSCE Mission to Moldova, the Irish and Ukrainian OSCE Chairmanships, the EU Special Repre-
sentative, Kalman Mizsei, the EU Delegation to Moldova and the British Embassy in Chisinau
since 2003. He researched and wrote a report for the European Parliament on the Transnistrian
conﬂict (Wolff 2012) and subsequently carried out a gap analysis of the Moldovan govern-
ment’s Bureau for Reintegration on behalf of the EU Delegation in Chisinau. Both studies
drew on more than 20 conﬁdential interviews each with representatives of the Moldovan
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government, the Transnistrian authorities, and international ofﬁcials in Chisinau, Vienna, Brus-
sels, London, Berlin, New York, and Washington.
3. For a range of relevant open-source reports by Wolff on the Transnistrian settlement process,
see http://www.stefanwolff.com/publications/reports-on-transnistria. Wolff has additionally
been involved with the Gagauzian issue, advising the Legal Department of the Moldovan Par-
liament on the interpretation of the 1995 Special Status Law for Gagauzia (2004–2007) and
working with EUSR Kalman Mizsei on a resolution to the 2007 post-election crisis in Gagauzia.
Open source reports on Gagauzia authored by Wolff, can be accessed via http://www.
stefanwolff.com/publications/reports-on-gagauzia.
4. While we recognize the debate regarding the distinction between “exporting democracy” and
“promoting democracy” (Diamond 1992), we use the term “promotion” in relation to the rel-
evant efforts of both democratic and autocratic regimes. See also Lowenthal (1991) and Car-
others (1999).
5. We acknowledge that there is some debate over the degree to which external factors can
account for domestic regime change or consolidation, that is, whether autocracy or democ-
racy promotion have any causal effect. This debate is covered, among others, by Agné
(2012), Bridoux and Russell (2013), Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson (2006), Goldsmith
(2001), Knack (2004), Lindberg (2006), Paxton and Morishima (2005), Przeworski et al.
(2000), Teorell and Hadenius (2009), and Wahman (2012).
6. See also Ambrosio (2010), Tolstrup (2009).
7. According to World Bank data available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?
source=2&country=MDA&series=&period=
8. 370,000 are recorded as working abroad for over a 12-month period, 206,000 of them in
Russia. NEXUS Moldova study, Imedia 25 October 2013.
9. According to World Bank data available at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?
source=2&country=MDA&series=&period=
10. While Shevchuk had visited EU capitals, his election did not depend on any EU inﬂuence.
11. Estonian President Hendrik Ilves said that Moldova was one of the most successful states in the
Eastern Partnership, quoted in Imedia 18 October 2013. See also Eckart Stratenschulte, IPN 21
May 2014.
12. Russia’s permanent representative to the EU Vladimir Cijov warned that Moldova’s signature
of an association agreement with the EU “could generate problems”, quoted by Kyiv-based
Obozrevatel.com, 14 January 2014.
13. Moldova could not join both; requirements of the customs union would not be compatible
with DCFTA commitments or indeed WTO requirements, since Moldova would have to
adjust its tariffs. Moldova’s adhesion on 10 October 2011 to the CIS free trade area is
however compatible, a point reafﬁrmed at a meeting of CIS economy ministers in Moscow
on 13 March 2014, see Imedia 10–17 March 2014.
14. Moldovan parliament speaker Corman noted at a meeting of his Eastern Partnership peers
that recognition of the European perspective, at least for countries like Moldova, which are
determined to follow the European path and which have obtained good results in this
regard, will consolidate the pro-European forces in these countries.” Imedia, 7 April 2014.
15. Commentator Dmitri Ciubesenco wrote that “so-called European integration is a myth
because nobody is planning on accepting Ukraine or Moldova into the EU. Zombiﬁed poli-
ticians from governments in Kyiv and Chisinau can practice auto-training in the mirror as
much as they want, telling themselves we are European and we will get an integration per-
spective, but nobody is planning on allowing these countries in the EU”. Panorama, 11 April
2014.
16. According to European Commission data available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2006/september/tradoc_113419.pdf.
17. Victor Chirila, director of the Association for Foreign Policy commented: “if these reforms were
explained properly, conﬁdence in them would have been higher. I would like EU partners to
understand that the soft power they promote in our region can be successful when it can
match the tough instruments of the Russian Federation” Adevarul, 13 February 2014.
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18. “The beneﬁts of the association agreement will not be immediate for the majority of society in
the ﬁrst few years. Consequently, the mobilization of the political class and society will be
extremely difﬁcult”. Editorial in Adevarul, 24 June 2014.
19. Imedia 26 April 2012.
20. The church synod declared that the EU was pro-gay: “The West is ignoring God’s orders and
interdictions”, Imedia 4 September 2014.
21. Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, said: “The unilateral
decision to stop retransmission of these three channels can curb media freedom and limit
media pluralism in Moldova, not least since these channels were known for their critical
reporting on the current government.” The channels were Accent TV, RTR Moldova and
Jurnal TV. Imedia 10 January 2014.
22. Over 70% of newspapers distributed in Moldova are in Russian. In 2013, a total of 7.4 million
newspapers and over 180,000 magazines were distributed in Moldova, of which 73% were in
Russian and 27% were in Romanian, according to data from the Bureau to Audit Circulation
and the Internet. Agora.md, 12 May 2014.
23. LDP deputy Vadim Vacarciuc said that “people in Moldova are too inﬂuenced by Russian mass
media”, and that countermeasures needed to be taken. Imedia 20 March 2014; cf commenta-
tor Vadim Vasiliu “Russian propaganda is unstoppable in Moldova…“Russian TV stations
broadcast without any restrictions in Moldova programmes that promote separatism and
the annexation of foreign territories”. Jurnal de Chisinau, 25 March 2014.
24. The BCC noted that the decision was necessary because the channel did not comply with Mol-
dovan legislation on balanced coverage. The media watchdog also applied maximum ﬁnes for
REN TV Moldova and RTR Moldova, and publicly warned Prime and TV7 for violations. Imedia, 4
July 2014.
25. This facility for Transnistrians is seen by Russian observers in terms of linkage. Leonid Slutki,
head of the Russian State Duma committee for CIS countries noted that visa free travel to
the EU for Transnistrians would test their ﬁdelity towards Russia, Publika TV, 4 December 2013.
26. According to Transnistrian President Shevchuk, there are 200,000 Russian passport holders in
Transnistria. http://www.euronews.com/2014/06/07/interview-transnistran-president-shevchuk-
says-he-wants-a-civilised-divorce-/
27. According to the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) database at http://data.
imf.org/?sk=40313609-F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5.
28. Former premier and businessman Ion Sturza said during a TV programme that about 70
percent of Moldovan banks are in reality owned by Russian banks. Imedia, 3 July 2014. Econ-
omist Mihai Roscovan regrets that governments allowed “the over-penetration of Russian
capital in Moldova, since this… undermines our independence.” He reported that nearly
75% of wine factories belong to Russians, as does more than 90% of electricity production.
Russian companies also control the petrol market. The only international airport in Moldova
was given into concession to Russia for 49 years. Imedia, 8 July 2014.
29. Commentator Vitalie Ciobanu noted, “Moscow has powerful leverage over Moldova: the Trans-
nistrian regime, Gagauz separatism, trade embargos, the expulsion of Moldovan workers from
Russia… There are also a number of pro-Russian business people originally from Moldova,
‘luxury gastarbeiters’ who are creating parties, distributing gifts to pensioners, donating to
police stations.” Radio Free Europe, 20 February 2014.
30. According to Moldovan foreign minister Natalia Gherman, the Party of Communists and the
Party of Socialists in Moldova also receive support from Moscow in exchange for promoting
integration in the Eurasian Union. PublikaTV, 21 May 2014.
31. Jurnal.md (10 April 2014) quoting Russian website mk.ru
32. Moroever, contradicting Moscow’s ofﬁcial line, Russian consumer watchdog Rospotrebnadzor
found that Transnistrian wines did meet the required standards (which had been disputed in
the initial import restrictions) and said it would consider Gagauzian produce separately, in a
press release issued 5 March 2014, quoted by Imedia 5 March.
33. In a press interview, Russian Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin noted that in Moldova’s case
“association with the EU is an attempt to join a foreign gang.” Moscow will “insist on revising
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economic ties with Moldova” and added that “association with the EU involves a change in
Moldova’s neutrality status.” “We remember who trampled all over the Kozak memorandum”.
Kommersant.md, 12 May 2014.
34. In just a few days the success story of Moldova has turned into the lair of the most perverse
thieves… an entire country is being stripped by… corruption networks”, Adevarul 21 October
2015. Moldova government collapses amid scandal, Financial Times 29 October 2015.
35. Roman Hudeakov, a deputy from the Russian Liberal Democratic Party made a request to the
Russian foreign ministry to recognize Transnistria’s independence or allow it to join Russia. Mr
Hudeakov justiﬁed his request by the need to not allow “a scenario similar to the one in
Ukraine” to happen in Moldova. Hudeakov said that Transnistria is host to over 200,000
Russian citizens. “Now, Transnistria is surrounded by states which are outright hostile and
inclined to using force and risks becoming a victim of military annexation by the pro-Roma-
nian government in Moldova.” Imedia, 3 March 2014. Transnistrian Supreme Soviet chairman
Mihai Burla allegedly wrote to the Russian Duma asking for legislation similar to that enacted
for Crimea to allow Transnistria to join Russia. Vedemosti, 18 March 2014 quoted by Imedia.
Commentator Madalin Necsutu wrote that keeping Transnistria in a state of “political
limbo” plays into Russia’s geopolitical game. Evenimentul Zilei 20 May 2014.
36. The Transnistrian Supreme Soviet decided on 16 April 2014 to approach the Russian Duma for
recognition. Kommersant.md, 15 April 2014.
37. Moreover, the Ukrainian crisis has eliminated any reasonable prospect of progress in these
talks for the time being.
38. Ion Iovcev, principal of the Lucian Blaga Romanian high school in Tiraspol, has said that Trans-
nistrian pressures on the school intensiﬁed from 5 November 2013, after the pro-European
demonstration in Moldova, when it became clear that Moldova would initial the association
agreement with the EU. Jurnal de Chisinau, 13 January 2014
39. Transnistria’s State Security Commission called for the withdrawal from Bender “of all units of
police, security forces, and ofﬁcial institutions belonging to Moldova, including the police
station in Bender”. Imedia 23 January 2014.
40. Ukrainian Vice-admiral Igor Kabanenko spoke of a Russian planning document which outlines
using armed force to create a “control line” along Lugansk-Donetsk-Nikolaev-Odessa-Tiraspol
axis, which would block Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and bring Moldova into the conﬂict
Adevarul, 8 March 2014.
41. General Philip Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command
Operations (SACEUR), said that Russia has enough force at Ukraine’s borders to occupy Trans-
nistria if it wanted to. Imedia, 24 March 2014.
42. Russian political scientist Evgheni Mincenko said that Moscow could use the Crimean pre-
cedent to annex Transnistria. Russian portal Novii Reghion, cited by Ziarul National, 22 April
2014.
43. Commentator Nadine Chilianu wrote that Russia was encouraging separatist movements in
Moldova’s south. After a visit to Moscow, the head of the Gagauz legislature Konstantinov
said that Moscow would open a consulate in the region, and there would be cuts of 35–50
percent for the cost of Russian gas, and Gagauz citizens will be able to get Russian citizenship
more easily. Jurnal de Chisinau, 29 March 2014.
44. EU engagement with Komrat has always been relatively limited, and the Gagauz dimension of
the Transnistrian settlement process has been largely neglected. A last-minute visit by then EU
enlargement commissioner Stefan Füle in late January 2015, therefore, did nothing to change
the minds of Gagauzian voters in the referendum.
45. Commentator Vitali Andrievski expected Russia to create new sources of instability, including
in Transnistria, Gagauzia, and Balti. Ava.md, 4 July 2014.
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